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Abstract: Despite one of the most extensive sanctions regimes in history, including an embargo 
on missile technologies, North Korea has taken huge steps forward in its ballistic missile 
program. This article provides insights into the limitations of, and challenges in implementing, 
supply-side approaches to missile nonproliferation. Considering North Korea’s recent progress 
and efforts to evade sanctions, the article highlights the continuing need to strengthen efforts to 
counter illicit trade in missile-related technologies. The article makes recommendations in three 
areas in which missile nonproliferation efforts could be strengthened: cooperatively through 
furthering the UNSCR 1540 agenda, “bottom-up” by engaging the private sector, and more 
unilaterally through developing a greater understanding of proliferation networks and working to 
enhance the toolset available to counter them. While derived from the in-depth missile case study 
presented, these recommendations have value more broadly in countering the illicit trade in 
WMD-related technologies. 
 
 
 
North Korea took huge steps forward in its ballistic missile program in 2017, conducting 
successful tests of two Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) designs seemingly capable of 
striking the Continental US, alongside a handful of other successful firsts. Considering this 
progress, this article provides insights into the limitations of, and challenges in implementing, 
supply-side approaches to missile nonproliferation. While the DPRK may have already 
overcome this range of supply-side controls put in place by the international community, the 
North Korean case provides some insights to strengthen future efforts to counter the illicit trade 
in missile-related technologies.  
 
The article begins by summarizing recent discussions regarding North Korea’s technical 
successes, before considering the North Korean networks that have sourced missile-related 
technologies, advanced manufacturing capabilities, and know-how and intangibles in the face of 
“insufficient and highly inconsistent” sanctions implementation around the world.1 Building on 
                                               
1 “Insufficient and highly inconsistent” used by the UN Panel: UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2017/150, 27 February 2017, p.4. 
this analysis of the failure of supply-side controls, the article considers three areas in which 
missile nonproliferation efforts could be strengthened: cooperatively through furthering the 
UNSCR 1540 agenda, “bottom-up” by engaging the private sector, and more unilaterally through 
developing a greater understanding of proliferation networks and working to enhance the 
unilateral toolset available to counter them. While derived from the in-depth missile case study 
presented, these recommendations have value more broadly in countering illicit trade in other 
WMD-related technologies.  
 
 
Missile Milestones under Kim Jong-un  
 
The North Korean missile program has accelerated since Kim Jong-un assumed power following 
his father’s death in December 2011. Almost three-quarters of the missile flight tests undertaken 
in North Korea have taken place under Kim Jong-un’s leadership.2 2017 was a year of firsts, 
notably including three successful ICBM tests in the latter half of the year, with both the 
Hwasong-14, and the more capable Hwasong-15 demonstrating the capability to strike the 
Continental US.3 With the successful Hwasong-15 test, Kim Jong Un alleged that “the historic 
cause of completing the state nuclear force… was realized”.4 These ICBM successes came 
against a background of testing of various other new missile systems in 2016 and 2017: a 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and its land-based variant, a new Intermediate 
Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and a new variant of the Scud system.  
 
On the road towards these milestones, North Korea initially moved from reproducing Soviet-
designed systems to producing its own similar or scaled-up variants.5 Other longer-range systems 
–mostly presented as space launch vehicles– have seemingly drawn together constituent parts of 
missiles to produce novel designs.6 Many commentators have also noticed possible Russian 
design heritage reflected in the Musudan missile, noting similarities with the SS-N-6 SLBM, and 
that engineers from the relevant Russian design bureau may have travelled to North Korea in the 
                                               
2 31 tests took place before the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011; 117 tests took place in total (as of July 
2018). Missile test data from Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “North Korea Missile Test Database”, 
<http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/>, accessed 10 July 2018.  
3 See for example – David Wright, “North Korea’s London Missile Test Yet”, All Things Nuclear, 28 November 
2017, <https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-yet>, accessed 10 July 2018.  
4 “Kim Jong Un Guides Test fire of ICBM Hwasong-15”, KCNA, 29 November 2017, available from 
KCNAwatch.co, <https://kcnawatch.co/newstream/1511960471-567278968/kim-jong-un-guides-test-fire-of-icbm-
hwasong-15/>, accessed 10 July 2018.  
5 See for example how North Korea replicated and scaled up the Scud to create the Nodong: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., 
“A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK”, CNS Occasional Paper No.2, 1999, p.20. 
6 See ‘Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): North Korea’s Missile Program’, cable from the Secretary of 
State to the US Embassy in Paris, France, 09STATE103755_a, 6 October 2009, document obtained by Wikileaks, 
<https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE103755_a.html>, accessed 24 December 2017.  
early 1990s.7 However, some of the newer missiles unveiled –including the ICBMs– have an 
unclear design heritage and could well be indigenous North Korean designs. Debate is still 
ongoing regarding North Korea’s manufacturing capability, and the genesis of recent successes.  
 
For example, some analysts and reporters have claimed that the program has benefitted from 
significant external sources of technology. A heated debate occurred between analysts in summer 
2017 regarding the origins of liquid-fueled engines used in the Hwasong-12 IRBM and 
Hwasong-14 ICBM. Michael Elleman suggested that these missiles utilized a modified RD-250 
engine, noting that “an unknown number of these engines” –likely a “few dozen”– were 
“probably acquired though illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine”.8 Reports in 
September 2017 suggested that North Korea was reliant on imports of advanced missile fuels.9 
Most recently, March 2018 analysis in Jane’s Intelligence Review suggested that the Hwasong-
15 likely benefitted from external "knowledge, technology or hardware", and speculated over 
connections between the missile and a Soviet design from the 1960s.10 Most of the claims of 
North Korean technological dependence have been based on limited or questionable evidence, or 
heavily disputed by other missile experts.11 Analysts disputing claims of significant and 
clandestine external support have tended to argue that North Korea has managed to successfully 
indigenously produce these, and other requisite missile technologies, after decades of effort.12  
 
Indeed, evidence of significant –and possibly state-sanctioned– transfers of goods, materials or 
technical support is currently lacking. However, there is clear evidence that North Korea has 
benefitted from dual-use technologies procured from the international market to advance its 
program. Despite the secrecy surrounding procurement networks, there is still sufficient evidence 
in the public domain to draw lessons for future missile nonproliferation efforts.  
 
 
Procurement from the International Marketplace 
 
                                               
7 For example, see: Jeffrey Lewis, “Origins of the Musudan IRBM”, Armscontrolwonk blog, 11 June 2012, 
<https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205337/origins-of-the-musudan-irbm/>, accessed 10 July 2018. 
8 Michael Elleman, ‘The secret to North Korea’s ICBM success’, IISS Voices, 14 August 2017, 
<https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2017-adeb/august-2b48/north-korea-icbm-success-
3abb>, accessed 10 July 2018.  
9 William J. Broad and David Sanger, "The Rare, Potent Fuel Powering North Korea's Weapons", New York Times, 
17 September 2017.   
10 Markus Schiller and Nick Hansen, "Retro Rocket", Jane's Intelligence Review, March 2018, pp.8-15. 
11 On the Ukraine connection see for example, Mariana Budjeryn and Andre Zhalko-Tytarenko, "Missile Engines: 
Not From Ukraine", Atlantic Council, 12 September 2017, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/north-
korean-missile-engines-not-from-ukraine>, accessed 10 July 2018; on fuel production see Jeffrey Lewis et. al., 
‘DPRK Domestic Production of UDMH’, Armscontrolwonk blog, 27 September 2017, 
<https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1204170/domestic-udmh-production-in-the-dprk/>, accessed 10 July 
2018. 
12 See for example Joshua H. Pollack, ‘How North Korea makes its missiles’, NK News.org, 18 August 2017. 
From the early days of the missile program –and continuing after UN sanctions were put in place 
in 2006– the DPRK has sourced a wide variety of “dual-use” technologies from the international 
marketplace. Dual-use goods can have utility in WMD and military programs, or civilian 
applications. Rather than full missile systems or parts, they include many of the requisite 
technologies for manufacture –for example, materials, electronic components, chemicals for 
propellants, computers and testing equipment.13 Since UN sanctions banned North Korea’s import 
of these technologies in 2006, several examples (likely the “tip of the iceberg”) of attempts to 
illicitly procure these types of goods have been uncovered by governments and the UN sanctions 
Panel of Experts.  
 
Two launches of the Unha-3, purportedly a space launch vehicle, in 2012 and 2016 provide some 
insights into North Korea’s use of foreign-sourced components. Following the tests, the South 
Korean military fished some of the wreckage out of the sea. The 2012 launch included 14 
different foreign-origin items including vintage Soviet and cannibalized Scud parts, and 
electronic components from China, South Korea, Switzerland, and the UK and US.14 The debris 
from the 2016 launch also included similar foreign-sourced electronics.15  
 
By contacting the manufacturers with component serial numbers, the UN Panel of Experts 
attempted to gain insights into the DPRK’s illicit supply chains. Similar UK-origin pressure 
transducers were found in both rockets – those from the 2012 debris were procured through a 
Taiwanese entity, while those in the 2016 debris appear to have been procured through Chinese 
intermediaries.16 The UN Panel of Experts noted of the 2016 launch that almost all the foreign 
components recovered were “off-the-shelf items that do not meet any of the specifications in the 
lists of prohibited items”.17 Using foreign-sourced components does not necessarily reflect North 
Korean dependency or inability to produce them– it may be more economically viable and fairly 
easy to import them, and the goods themselves  are likely of a higher quality.  
 
A second example –this time at the larger and more finished end of the spectrum– relates to the 
truck chassis used in the Transport Erector Launchers (TELs). In 2012, six large eight-axle TELs 
were exhibited during a parade in Pyongyang carrying an early ICBM design.18 The chassis of 
these vehicles had been exported to the DPRK from China in 2011, with the stated end-use of 
                                               
13 See for example the technologies listed in Category II of the “MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology 
Annex” available from <http://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MTCR-TEM-
Technical_Annex_2017-10-19-corr.pdf>, accessed 10 July 2018. 
14 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2014/147, 6 March 2014, p.22-23.  
15 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2017/150, 27 February 2017, p.27-28. 
16 Ibid, p.27. 
17 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2014/147, 6 March 2014, p.23.  
18 Larry Shaughnessy, ‘Truck raises questions about China's role in North Korea's missile program’, CNN Online, 20 
April 2012. 
transporting timber.19 The UN Panel of Experts noted that the DPRK “deliberately breached the 
end user guarantee” in turning the trucks into TELs.20 However, given the Chinese company’s 
role in supplying the Chinese missile program, it is unlikely they were completely oblivious to 
potential missile-related end uses in North Korea.  
 
 
A Focus on Indigenization?  
 
Arguably the most important technologies that North Korea has shown a significant interest in 
procuring are manufacturing capabilities –for example, advanced Computer Numerically 
Controlled (CNC) machine tools. These tools can be used to accurately machine parts for a wide 
variety of applications, including for use in ballistic missiles. Whether this interest –as shown 
through the state media– has translated into actual advances in missile technology or is merely 
propaganda remains to be established.21 North Korea likely started to reverse-engineer machine 
tools procured from the Soviet Union in the 1990s. However, the country has continually sought 
CNC tools and constituent technologies from the international market place. 
 
Members of the Tsai family have allegedly been involved in supplying machine tools to North 
Korea since the late 1990s.22 In 2008, Taiwan-based Alex Tsai was indicted by a Taiwanese court 
for the re-export of three types of US-origin machine tools to North Korea. In 2013, Alex and his 
son Gary were arrested by the US authorities, Gary having established a US-based company to 
facilitate exports of “hundreds of thousands of dollars” of machine tools to his father for re-
export to North Korea.23  
 
Other cases have seen Chinese manufactured machine tools, some incorporating European-origin 
technology, being exported to North Korea.24 Images from a 2016 factory visit by Kim Jong-un 
showed a robotic arm attached to a CNC with a Swiss company logo visible.25 North Korea’s 
Ryonha Machinery Corporation, a UN designated machine tool manufacturer, can likely produce 
                                               
19 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, p.27.  
20 Ibid, p.27.  
21 For background on North Korea’s interest in CNC technology, see: James Pearson and Hyonhee Shin, “How a 
homemade tool helped North Korea's missile program”, Reuters, 12 October 2017. 
22 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Taiwanese Proliferators’, press release, 16 January 2009, 
<https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1359.aspx>, accessed 10 July 2018.  
23 United States of America v. Hsien Tai Tsai, ‘Criminal Complaint’, United States District Court, Northern District 
of Illinois, Eastern Division, 23 October 2012; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2014/147, 6 March 2014, p.24. 
24 See for example the case listed in UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2017/150, 27 February 2017, p.65; Joby Warrick, ‘Kim Jong Un’s rockets are getting an 
important boost —from China’, Washington Post, 13 April 2017.  
25 Alastair Gale & Jonathan Cheng, “Inside North Korea's Accelerated Plan to Build a Viable Missile”, Wall Street 
Journal, 15 May 2017. 
indigenous copies of machine tools and seemingly attempted to export these through Chinese 
and Russian front companies in 2014 after its designation.26 However, North Korea is still likely 
reliant on certain foreign components and parts for more advanced machines.27  
 
 
The Modus Operandi of North Korea’s Procurement Networks 
 
North Korea’s WMD-related illicit procurement networks generally involve middlemen targeting 
suppliers and distributors using well understood deceptive means to hide the ultimate end use of 
the goods. The techniques used by these illicit procurement networks have been frequently used 
by those pursuing technologies for outlawed or clandestine WMD programs. For example, North 
Korean procurement agents have set up and utilized front companies and multiple aliases, 
provided false end-user details, falsified paperwork, co-opted unscrupulous or indifferent 
suppliers, and exploited naïve or nonchalant distributors. 
 
These efforts have frequently made use of existing business networks and diaspora populations, 
as well as North Korean diplomats and intelligence operatives based overseas. For example, this 
year German intelligence officials have stated that the North Korean embassy in Berlin had been 
used to procure unspecified dual-use missile and nuclear related goods.28 Elements of North 
Korean intelligence are heavily involved in overseas sales of arms, including military goods 
manufactured using foreign components, and their involvement in illicit WMD-related 
procurement is also likely.29 
 
One factor which has significantly shaped North Korean procurement networks is the country’s 
shared land border with China, its most significant trading partner, accounting for around 90% of 
North Korea’s international trade. China also plays host to a growing number of small private 
sector companies producing dual-use and missile-related technologies. These sensitive products 
were previously the preserve of China’s large state-owned arms and strategic enterprises.30 The 
proximity of such a growing and laxly regulated market for, and producer of, dual use goods –
and also a notable transshipment point for WMD programs– on North Korea’s border presents an 
unprecedented challenge for supply-side controls.  
                                               
26 Jeffrey Lewis and Catherine Dill, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: DPRK Front Companies in China and Russia’, 38North, 
18 November 2014, <https://www.38north.org/2014/11/jlewis111814/>, accessed 10 July 2018.  
27 In 2013, the UN Panel of Experts suspected the quality of Ryonha’s machines was “low”. UN Security Council, 
‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, p.30. 
28 “German spy chief alleges North Korea uses Berlin embassy for procurement”, Reuters, 3 February 2018; 
Germany-based diplomats had previously sought to acquire machine tools - See UN Security Council, ‘Report of the 
Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, p.29. 
29 James Pearson and Rosana Latiff, “North Korea spy agency runs arms operation out of Malaysia, U.N. says”, 
Reuters, 26 February 2017.   
30 Daniel Salisbury and Lucy Jones, ‘Exploring the changing role of Chinese entities in WMD Proliferation’, China 
Quarterly (Vol.225, March 2016), pp.50-72.  
 
China is not the only country which has played the role of supplier or transshipment point, with 
many countries featuring in the DPRK’s networks. A 2018 study by the Institute for Science and 
International Security (ISIS) noted 52 countries had seen UN sanctions violations during 2017.31 
A separate study at King’s College London in 2016 noted over 60 countries had been used by the 
DPRK in its WMD and military procurement activities.32  North Korea has made especial use of 
its backyard in East Asia. These countries represent places where the DPRK has pre-existing 
business networks, and host economies sufficiently advanced to be seeking high-tech dual-use 
goods without raising alarm. This is seen through use of Taiwanese intermediaries, discussed 
above, and the expansion of North Korean procurement activities in Hong Kong and other South 
East Asian hubs since the late 2000s.33  
 
In transporting goods to and from North Korea, larger and more specialized shipments –for 
example complete missile or bulky weapons systems– have tended to be shipped on state-owned 
vessels, and hidden under bulk cargos.  More recently, increased scrutiny on North Korean state-
owned carriers, and procurement largely of smaller dual-use items rather than larger full systems, 
has led to increased use of commercial containerized shipping, transshipment through Chinese 
ports, and transfer over the Chinese land border.34  
 
North Korea’s networks have found ways to avoid using the regulated aspects of the 
international financial system in making payments for goods. This has included exchange of bulk 
cash for missile-related goods –see for example the $850,000 cash payment Alex Tsai allegedly 
received from North Korean agents for a machine tool at Singapore airport in 2009.35 Otherwise, 
long and complex payment schemes are used, particularly avoiding foreign transactions and 
involvement of entities obviously linked to North Korea.36  
 
                                               
31 This included violations of the technology embargoes, as well as other sanctions violations listed in the UN Panel 
reports. David Albright et al. “52 Countries Involved in Violating UNSC Resolutions on North 
Korea throughout most of 2017”, ISIS Report, 9 March 2018, <http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/52_Countries_Involved_in_Violating_NK_UNSC_Resolutions_in_2017_9Mar2018_Final_%28
1%29.pdf>, accessed 10 July 2018.  
32 “North Korea’s Proliferation & Illicit Procurement Apparatus”, Project Alpha Report, King’s College London, 
May 2016, p.13. 
33 John Park and Jim Walsh, ‘Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences’, 
MIT Security Studies Program Report, August 2016, p.2.  
34 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2012/422, 14 June 2012, p.36. 
35 ‘(S) DPRK Proliferation-related Transaction in Singapore’, cable from the Secretary of State to the US Embassy 
in Singapore, 09STATE36855_a, 14 April 2009, document obtained by Wikileaks, 
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE36855_a.html>, accessed 24 December 2017.  
36 See for example the Royal Team Corporation example in supplying foreign components for the Unha-3. UN 
Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2017/150, 27 
February 2017, p.62. 
Enforcement actions undertaken by the US against large Chinese networks in 2016 and 2017 
have shown how Chinese middlemen and women have used private ledger systems, importing 
and selling North Korean coal in China, and using proceeds to fund exports of everything from 
sugar, to fertilizer, luxury goods and missile-related dual-use items to North Korea.37 These 
schemes have allowed designated North Korean entities to access the US financial system 
through Chinese intermediaries and shell companies registered in financial havens. 
 
 
Intangibles, Expertise and Espionage 
 
North Korea has long sought expertise and know-how for its missile program –what are often 
described as “intangibles”. Over the years, the DPRK’s program has benefitted from different 
sources –from very early collaboration with Soviet and Chinese scientists in the 1960s and 
1970s, to the efforts to attract scientists to move to the country from the Former Soviet Union in 
the 1990s.  
 
Attempts to insulate North Korea’s program from international expertise and collaboration have 
had limited success. The travel bans on designated individuals and those associated with various 
entities are known to have been breached repeatedly, with most cases reported publically relating 
to missile and arms exports rather than acquisition of technology and know-how.38 However, a 
case in 2017 did see Thailand implement sanctions by rejecting four visa applications by North 
Korean nationals to attend a course on satellite technology.39 
 
North Korea’s missile-related collaboration with Iran is well known, with extensive exports of 
missiles to the country during the Iran-Iraq war, and through continued exchange of missile 
technology into the 2000s. More recent US intelligence assessments suggest that Iran-North 
Korean exchanges of technology have slowed, although current exchanges of expertise are 
unclear.40 However, in 2016 the US Treasury sanctioned Iranian missile-related entities, noting 
                                               
37 See for example the cases of Chi Yupeng – court documents suggest “dual use goods” were transferred. United 
States of America v. $4,083,935.00 of funds associated with Dandong Chengtai Trading Limited, ‘Complaint’, 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, filed 22 August 2017, p.19, 
<https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/992451/download>, accessed 10 July 2018. And DHID – a 
study by C4ADS provided evidence that the DHID network was supplying dual-use technologies. ‘In China’s 
Shadow’, C4ADS and the ASAN Institute Report, August 2016, p.34-36. 
38 See for example, UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 
(2009)’, S/2017/150, 27 February 2017, p.68. 
39 ‘Letter dated 7 December 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations addressed to 
the Chair of the Committee’, S/AC.49/2017/140, 12 December 2017 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/AC.49/2017/140>, accessed 10 July 2018.  
40 See for example suggestion of Iran’s decreasing dependency on DPRK-origin missile parts, and Clapper’s 
remarks on Iran not receiving assistance for its ICBM efforts. Paul K. Kerr, Steven A. Hildreth and Mary Beth D. 
Nikitin, ‘Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation’, CRS Report, R43480, 26 February 
2016, p.4.   
that in recent years, engineers from Iran’s liquid-fueled missile program “traveled to North 
Korea to work on an 80-ton rocket booster”.41 
 
The North Korean program has also clearly benefitted from access to foreign academic 
institutions. A 2017 UN report noted that the main North Korean universities feeding the missile 
program had “bilateral agreements” with at least four Chinese and two Russian academic 
institutions.42 Reporting has also suggested that “hundreds” of North Korean scientists have 
studied outside the country in recent years, many at Chinese universities, even with Chinese 
government scholarships, and some on topics relevant to missile technologies.43 The DPRK has 
also used foreign universities to access global scholarly research, with North Korean students at 
one Chinese university downloading 57,000 academic papers on a single day in 2017.44 
 
The DPRK has also –with unclear levels of success– sought to employ industrial espionage to 
access sensitive missile-related information. In 2011 two North Korean diplomats based in 
Belarus travelled to Ukraine, seeking to gain access to “secret academic theses” from a 
Ukrainian rocket design bureau.45 These documents would have provided information on “new 
forms of technological processes for the design of missile systems, liquid-propellant engines, 
spacecraft and missile fuel supply systems and associated computer programmes”.46 The two 
North Korean officials were arrested by the Ukrainian authorities in a dramatic sting operation, 
the footage of which was released to the media last year.47 These North Korean agents currently 
remain in prison in Ukraine.  
 
Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, North Korea has likely benefitted from the availability of 
technical information in open sources –including online. Many technologies currently of interest 
to the North Korean missile program were mastered by the US and USSR from the 1950s 
onwards. Limited efforts by governments to prevent sensitive technical information from making 
its way online have been easily overwhelmed by the growing scale of this new challenge to 
export control.  
 
 
                                               
41 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile Procurement for Iran’, 
press release, 17 January 2016, <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0322.aspx>, accessed 
10 July 2018. 
42 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2017/150, 27 February 2017, p.49. 
43 Jeremy Page and Alastair Gale, ‘Behind North Korea’s Nuclear Advance: Scientists Who Bring Technology 
Home’, Wall Street Journal, 6 September 2017.  
44 Ibid. 
45 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)’, 
S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, p.25. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Nick Paton Walsh, Victoria Butenko and Barbara Arvanitidis, ‘The North Korean spies Ukraine caught stealing 
missile plans’, CNN Online, 1 September 2017.  
The Sanctions Regime and Missile Nonproliferation Efforts 
 
Much of the public discussion of sanctions on North Korea has related to those seeking to 
address the “demand-side” – measures which have sought to impose financial and diplomatic 
pressure, making the pursuit of WMD too costly for the Kim regime. Supply-side measures have 
been utilized by certain states –notably the US– to prevent North Korea’s access to WMD 
technologies since at least the 1990s. However, the mainstay of these supply-side measures has 
been sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council since 2006.48 These place a series of 
standardized legal requirements on all states to prevent the acquisition of WMD technologies by 
North Korea. In terms of the missile program, the focal point within these UN supply-side 
measures is the embargo on missile-related technologies, which was first put in place alongside 
the embargo on nuclear technologies.  
 
In July 2006, following a series of North Korean missile tests, the Security Council required that 
states should “exercise vigilance and prevent” transfers of “missile and missile-related items, 
materials, goods and technology” to the DPRK.49 The resolution also sought to limit North 
Korea’s missile industry from gaining hard currency, noting that states should “exercise 
vigilance and prevent” missile related exports.50 A resolution later that year strengthened the 
language, deciding states “shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer” of missile 
technology to North Korea “through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag 
vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories”.51  
 
Several other UN measures have also sought to prevent technical assistance and disrupt the 
activities of North Korea’s program. A 2006 UN resolution decided “All Member States shall 
prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories” of missile-related 
“technical training, advice, services or assistance”.52 In 2016 it was further decided that states 
should prevent their educational institutions from providing “specialized teaching or training” to 
DPRK nationals in WMD related areas, including “aerospace engineering, aeronautical 
engineering and related disciplines”.53 
  
The earlier resolutions also imposed asset freezes and travel bans on certain individuals and 
entities related to the WMD programs.54 Entities on the “1718 Sanctions List” include those 
involved in the missile and space programs, missile-related exports and procurement, and 
                                               
48 It should be noted that other countries – such as the US and Japan – had sanctioned North Korea prior to 2006. 
49  UN Security Council Resolution 1695, 15 July 2006, S/RES/1695. 
50 Ibid. 
51 UN Security Council Resolution 1718, 14 October 2006, S/RES/1718.  
52 Ibid, OP8.c. – this provision also dictated states should prevent the training, advice, services and assistance 
provided by North Korea in this area.  
53 UN Security Council Resolution 2270, 2 March 2016, S/RES/2270, OP17. This language was strengthened from 
UN Security Council Resolution 1874, 12 June 2009, S/RES/1874, OP28.  
54 UN Security Council Resolution 1718, 14 October 2006, S/RES/1718, OP8.d, 8.e.  
financing of these activities.55 The UN resolutions also prohibit broader activity-based 
proliferation financing related to North Korea’s WMD efforts, including the missile program.56 
 
These measures have been put in place against a background of broader efforts to prevent 
ballistic missile proliferation. Since 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has 
sought to harmonize missile-related export controls among the main missile technology holding 
states. The MTCR guidelines steer member states decision-making about transfers of missile 
related goods. These are implemented through national export control systems which must meet 
certain standards for membership. The associated MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology 
Annex –listing controlled missile technologies– is used by MTCR member states, and many 
other national authorities around the world, in their export control systems. Besides frequently 
updating the MTCR annexes to reflect technological advances, the regime’s members also 
exchange information on missile proliferation trends, and conduct outreach to non-members on 
the group's activities, and missile nonproliferation efforts.   
 
 
Lax Sanctions Implementation and Enforcement  
 
The UN sanctions resolutions are legally binding for all states around the world, and national 
governments are responsible for their implementation within their jurisdictions. However, as 
Andrea Berger suggested in a recent RUSI report, not a single element of the UN sanctions 
regime “enjoys robust international implementation”.57 This includes the prohibition on the 
transfer of missile-related items.  
 
At the national level, the export of missile related-goods and “intangibles” –alongside nuclear, 
chemical, biological and military technologies– are regulated through national export control 
systems. Industry must apply for, and receive, an export license before exporting certain 
proliferation-sensitive goods. This process allows governments to combine information 
submitted with the license application with classified intelligence to assess whether planned 
exports could be diverted for nefarious uses. Lists of technologies –nationally derived, but often 
based on the MTCR Annex– show which missile-related goods and information are “controlled”. 
A “catch-all” provision often means that non-controlled goods require a license if the exporter 
knows or suspects that they could end up in a WMD program. Other elements of the UN 
sanctions also need to be implemented at the national level: for example, border control systems 
are used to implement the travel ban, and academic vetting schemes allow states to prevent North 
Korean engineers from taking technical courses at foreign universities.  
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In theory, all countries should have a basic capacity to implement these UN missile-related 
sanctions. Since UNSCR1540 was passed in 2004, following the discovery of the AQ Khan 
network, it has been obligatory for states to have in place an “appropriate effective” export 
control system, border controls, and measures to prevent proliferation financing.58 However, 
almost fourteen years after the resolution’s passage, many states –particularly in the developing 
world– are still struggling to implement its more than 300 requirements.  
 
Even amongst the states that have acted to put in place new, or strengthen existing, export 
control systems, there are relatively few which have undertaken enforcement action against 
proliferators. For example, while China has taken significant steps to strengthen its export 
control systems, it has undertaken little public enforcement action, despite having frequently 
been exploited by WMD programs as a source of, and transshipment point for, sensitive 
technologies.59 Implementation of other missile-related measures, such as the targeted financial 
measures and travel bans, has also been patchy.60  
 
More broadly, the Trump administration did manage to secure significant international 
cooperation –particularly from Beijing– on the implementation of economic sanctions as part of 
its “maximum pressure” campaign in early 2018. However, following inter-Korean talks, and in 
the run-up to the June 2018 Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore, this pressure lapsed and is 
unlikely to be revived. Such developments could potentially impact on how governments and 
industry view and respond to North Korean illicit procurement efforts.  
 
States and non-governmental organizations have undertaken significant outreach efforts under 
the auspices of UNSCR 1540 and UN country-specific sanctions resolutions to help states better 
understand and implement their obligations. This outreach should continue: to further develop 
export control and other national systems, as well as furthering efforts to address related issues 
such as intangible transfers. However, the scarce resources relative to the scale of the challenge, 
and many states having competing security priorities, have limited the effectiveness of this 
outreach. Building capacity in states around the world –particularly beyond the obvious supplier 
states– will have utility for missile nonproliferation beyond the North Korean case. 
 
 
The Private Sector’s Role 
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Sanctions and export controls present a complex landscape for industry to comply with. This 
poses challenges for small and medium sized dual-use exporters, which unlike large defence and 
aerospace companies have limited resources to expend on compliance. While facing significant 
challenges and resource constraints, these companies –legitimate businesses keen to abide with 
the law– can play an important and proactive role in countering illicit procurement.  
 
A good example is provided by UK exporter Rakon UK, a manufacturer of oscillators that can be 
used in everything from household electronics to ballistic missile guidance systems. In 2005, 
elements of the British government approached the company to share intelligence that its goods 
may have benefitted the Iranian missile program.61 Sitting down together, the government 
representative and the company’s compliance officer could share different pieces of information, 
which when put together helped the company to prevent the further unintended diversion of its 
products.  
 
Companies often receive “request for quote” emails which they do not act on because they deem 
them suspicious. Because they often delete these emails and do not seek an export license, this 
information is not usually passed on to the national authority. This untapped information can 
provide vital intelligence about illicit procurement activities. Companies' technical personnel 
often have a better understanding of the technical specification and capabilities of their products: 
for example, which models and specifications could be used in missile applications (this does not 
always directly overlap with those listed on control lists). On the other side, governments have 
access to classified intelligence regarding missile procurement apparatus, program's needs, and 
illicit procurement trends, which could help industry better identify suspicious enquiries. When 
combined or shared, this information from the private sector and government can potentially 
allow for more effective risk mitigation.  
 
Rakon UK heavily bolstered its internal compliance program and enacted enhanced beyond-
compliance measures necessary to prevent exploitation by proliferators. This included additional 
due diligence measures, going beyond checking customer details against various sanction lists to 
conduct basic open source internet searches to identify inconsistencies within prospective 
transactions. These measures meant that the company was more effectively able to separate the 
suspicious enquiries from the legitimate ones, and avoid doing business with entities likely to be 
involved in missile or WMD proliferation. 
 
Sharing information about suspicious enquiries and illicit trade between industry and 
government does not come without challenges.62 Companies may be concerned about potential 
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prosecution if they have been in contact with entities linked to WMD programs, even if they 
forgo business transactions. Conversely, there are clear barriers for government to overcome in 
finding ways to share information about proliferation networks, which is often derived from 
classified intelligence.  
 
Seeking to engage industry in nonproliferation efforts will only be effective in cases where there 
is a comprehensive export control system in place, and where the state is a willing and receptive 
participant. Several steps can help to build a dialogue between industry and government to share 
information and encourage beyond-compliance practices: conducting training on proliferation 
risks as well as the export control system, providing a point of contact for information sharing 
with government, and providing other opportunities for industry to engage such as at trade 
shows. A “neutral” third party – such as a trade association, a nongovernmental organization, or 
academic institution – could prove useful in coordinating engagement efforts, and allaying 
industry concerns.   
 
 
Unilateral Tools to Counter Proliferation Networks 
 
The sanctions regime imposed against North Korea –both to constrain North Korea's supply of 
WMD-related goods and affect its willingness to continue these programs– is amongst the most 
extensive in history. However, it has not prevented the country from successfully testing an 
ICBM. It is possible that supply-side measures have slowed development by delaying or 
preventing North Korea’s procurement of key chokepoint technologies. It is also highly likely 
that supply-side controls have raised the costs for North Korea in procuring missile- and other 
WMD-related goods. However, the UN Panel of Experts’ view in 2013 that sanctions had “in all 
likelihood considerably delayed the timetable” of North Korea’s WMD programs has been 
replaced by deep seated questioning regarding the “efficacy” of the UN sanctions regime.63 
Clearly, supply-side controls cannot defeat a determined and entrepreneurial proliferator.  
 
Besides not having the full intended effect, this extensive web of sanctions has had significant 
unintended consequences. The scholarly literature on sanctions has tended to under-consider 
these unintended effects, the implications of criminalization, and how this can further state-
sponsored crime and innovation amongst sanctions-busters.64 Some of these arguments regarding 
criminalization and state-sponsored crime are redundant in this case –North Korea was 
undertaking criminal activity long before the expansion of sanctions over the past decade. 
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However, other unintended consequences are apparent. Recent research by John Park and Jim 
Walsh has noted that the risk posed by sanctions has been increasingly monetized by China-
based middlemen.65 As a result these networks have become more capable, are able to offer a 
broader range of services including financing and logistics, and have become larger and more 
resilient. The large Chinese networks trading in both regular commodities and dual-use goods 
subject to US sanction and asset seizure in 2016 and 2017 likely reflect these trends. The 
Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. (DHID) network purportedly accounted for 
20% of China-North Korea trade in 2010, and the Chi Yupeng network accounted for almost 
10% of Chinese imports from the DPRK in 2016.66 Aaron Arnold has also emphasized the way in 
which proliferation networks can adapt and innovate, particularly in response to nonproliferation 
tools.67 However, while much work has been undertaken on WMD-related illicit trade, there has 
been relatively little work which has sought to conceptualize the activities of these networks.  
 
There has also been little effort to consider how these networks might be countered in a proactive 
way –especially when overseas governments are unwilling or unable to act. The US, and to a 
lesser extent a small number of other states, have taken some unilateral action, using targeted 
sanctions and designations. More recently, newer tools have been used against proliferation 
networks by the US on a very limited scale, borrowing from the playbook used to counter other 
illicit activities such as narcotics trafficking. For example, to counter Chinese serial supplier of 
Iran's missile program Karl Lee, in 2014 the US government issued a FBI wanted poster, a 
$5million reward for information leading to his capture and seized almost $7million of his 
network’s assets.68 More recently, civil asset forfeiture has been used against DHID and other 
large North Korean networks based in China.69 These tools cannot be utilized without political, 
bureaucratic and practical consequences, particularly in terms of affecting the willingness of 
overseas governments to cooperate on nonproliferation. The challenges and opportunities 
presented by these tools need full exploration.  
 
 
Conclusions: Lessons for Nonproliferation? 
 
While the genesis of recent North Korean success in its missile program –and particularly the 
role of external sources of technology vis a vis indigenization– remains hotly disputed, there are 
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clearly lessons which can be derived from the case for future missile nonproliferation efforts.  In 
terms of general lessons, the inadequacy of supply-side controls alone, and especially in 
preventing missile development by a determined proliferator, is clear. North Korea's 
procurement networks have shown themselves to be more than capable of acquiring dual-use 
technologies from the international market place. An apparent focus on procurement and 
replication of advanced manufacturing technology appears to have led North Korea to indigenize 
processes required to produce missile technologies, further limiting the effects of sanctions. Lax 
implementation of sanctions and related supply-side controls has been a major factor in 
undermining their success. However, this is not unusual, being seen in the clear majority of cases 
where UN sanctions and arms embargos have been put in place.   
 
The case has highlighted the need for continued efforts to implement UNSCR1540. Almost 14 
years after the resolution was passed, efforts need to be maintained to ensure that the capacity 
building activities which come under the umbrella of the resolution are continued. Part of this 
includes work to engage the private sector. The resolution states that governments should 
"develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their 
obligations”.70 The example of Rakon UK provided above illustrates how aware and proactive 
suppliers of missile-related dual-use goods can play a proactive role in missile nonproliferation. 
Other means of encouraging a constructive and proactive dialogue between government and 
industry have been discussed. 
 
To counter proliferation networks operating in jurisdictions which are less willing to assist, 
efforts need to be made to further explore new and existing unilateral tools. Efforts to enhance 
this unilateral toolset need to begin with further research into proliferation networks—seeking to 
understand how they operate, adapt to new nonproliferation tools and shop for jurisdictions. The 
existing US unilateral toolset clearly draws from the playbooks used to counter illicit activities in 
other areas; are there further tools which could be borrowed? Consideration of these unilateral 
tools also needs to take into account possible unintended consequences, to avoid unintended 
political effects and –if possible– avoid making illicit trade more profitable for the middlemen.  
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